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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
) 
) 
) 
vs. 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) 
) 
BARBARA BRUNDAGE, RAY H. IVIE 
and J~ RULON MORGAN, 
. ) 
} 
} 
) 
Defendants-Respondents,) 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
} 
} 
) 
) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case NOo 18288 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a subrogation action by Plaintiff-Respondent 
Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, against Appellant Allstate 
Insurance Company, Respondents Barbara Brundage, and her attor-
neys Ray H. Ivie and J. Rulon Morgan, to recover the amount of 
no-fault personal injury protection benefits paid by Ohio 
Casualty to its insured Respondent Brundage. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
In response to motions for summary judgment by all par-
ties, the court held as follows: 
( 1) Respondents Barbar a Brundage, Ray H. tv ie and J. 
Rulon Morgan are not liable to reimburse Respondent Ohio Casualty 
for the no-fault personal injury protection (PIP) benefits paid 
by Ohio Casualty to Respondent Brundage, even though said 
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Respondents admittedly received double reimbursement for said 
special damages: First by the payment of the PIP benefits and 
second by the payment of a judgment which was not reduced by the 
PIP payments received by Brundage. 
(2) Even though Appellant Allstate (the liability 
carrier} had paid the full amount of the judgment (unreduced by 
the amount of PIP payments), Allstate must arbitrate Ohio 
Casualty's claim and is not entitled to any equitable reimburse-
ment from Respondents Brundage and her attorneys, and Allstate's 
cross-claim against Respondents Brundage and her attorneys was 
dismissed. 
( 3) Appellant Allstate is not entitled to declaratory 
relief concerning the liabilities and rights of the parties 
herein. 
(4) Over 1-1/2 years after the trial court dismissed 
Appellant Allstate from this action, the trial court set aside 
said dismissal pursuant to Rule 60 (b) (7), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant Allstate (liability carrier) seeks declaratory 
relief that, since it has paid Respondents Brundage (injured 
party) and her attorneys Ivie and Morgan, the full amount of the 
judgment in the personal injury action, which judgment was not 
reduced by the amount of PIP payments to Brundage, Appellant 
Allstate is not liable to Respondent Ohio Casualty (the no-fault 
carrier) ; and that Brundage is liable to Ohio Casualty to the 
- 2 -
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extent of double recovery, minus attorney's fees and costs. In 
the alternative, Appellant Allstate is entitled to equitable 
reimbursement from Brundage, to the extent of double recovery. 
With this ruling, Appellant seeks to reverse the trial court's 
dismissal of Ohio Casualty's complaint and Allstate's cross-claim 
against Respondants Brundage, Ivie and Morgan, and summary 
judgment should be granted in favor of Appellant. 
Appellant further seeks reversal of the court's order 
setting aside the dismissal of Ohio Casualty's complaint against 
Allstate, pursuant to Rule 60{b) (7), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which occurred more than 1-1/2 years after the 
dismissal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This case concerns the recovery of no-fault PIP benefits 
paid by Respondent Ohio Casualty to its insured Respondent 
Brundage for injuries she sustained in an automobile accident. 
Most of the facts in this case were created before this Court 
decided Allstate v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 {Utah 1980), and the 
Court's directions contained therein were therefore not followed; 
thereby creating a difficult set of circumstances for the trial 
court to apply the Ivie case. ~he relevant facts are as follows: 
Respondent Ohio Casualty is the no-fault insurer of 
Respondent Brundage, who was involved in an automobile accident 
with tort-feasor Jacqueline L. Kernan on May 7, 1976. {R. 29-32, 
41-42) Respondent Brundage sustained personal injuries therefrom 
and received no-fault PIP benefits from Ohio Casualty in the 
- 3 -
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amount of $8,313.80. (R. 17-18, 29-32, 41-42} 
Respondent Brundage then filed a personal injury action 
against Kernan in the Fourth Judicial District, Utah County, 
State of Utah, Civil No. 44997. Said personal injury 
action was tried in September, 1977, resulting in a finding by a 
jury that Brundage had sustained damages in the total amount of 
$27,000.00 (general damages of $18,771.16; special damages of 
$8,228.84). {R. 20, 202) All of the parties herein admit that 
the special damages of $8,228.84 awarded by the jury are the same 
damages for which Brundage was previously compensated through the 
PIP payment. (R. 17-18, 29-32, 41-42} 
The court did not reduce the judgment by the amount of 
the PIP payments received by Brundage; however, the court did 
reduce the judgment to $21,600.00 because the jury found that 
Brundage was comparatively negligent in the amount of 20%. 
(R. 22, 202) In the Judgment On The Verdict, the court ordered, 
"Defendant tKernanJ is hereby ordered to make payment directly to 
plaintiff Barbara A. Brundage and her attorneys J. Rulon Morgan 
and Ray H. Ivie." (Id.) Thereafter, Appellant Allstate, the 
liability carrier for Kernan, paid the $21,600.00 directly to 
Brundage and her attorneys pursuant to said order. (R. 29-32, 
41-42} 
Respondent Ohio Casualty made demand upon Allstate for 
reimbursement of the PIP payments to Brundage. (R. 118) 
Allstate denied said claim for reimbursement on the grounds that 
it had fully paid the judgment, which included the amount for the 
- 4 -
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reimbursement of the PIP payments. {R. 161-162) Ohio Casualty 
then commenced this action against Brundage, seeking reimbur-
sement of said PIP payments, upon the grounds that Brundage 
received payment of the judgment in full, which constituted 
double recovery. (R. 5) Ohio Casualty thereafter amended its 
complaint in July 1978, and brought an alternative claim against 
Allstate. (R. 13) Ohio Casualty again amended its complaint to 
name Brundage's attorneys, Ivie and Morgan, upon the grounds that 
the court in the personal injury action ordered the payment of 
the judgment to both Brundage and her attorneys. (R. 29) 
Ohio Casualty also commenced arbitration proceedings on 
October 21, 1977. (R. 139) The chairman of the arbitration com-
mittee responded to Ohio Casualty that the committee could not 
proceed with arbitration as long as the same matter was being 
litigated in the courts. (R. 149, 152) 
Shortly after Ohio Casualty filed its First Amended 
Complaint, Appellant Allstate made a motion for summary judgment 
on the grounds that Allstate had fully paid the judgment in the 
personal injury action and was therefore not liable to reimburse 
Ohio Casualty for said PIP payments. (R. 35) The trial court 
granted said motion in April 1979, and dismissed Allstate from 
the case. (R. 39-40) In May 1980, Respondent Ohio Casualty made 
a motion for relief from said judgment of dismissal, pursuant to 
Rule 60(b) (7), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and moved the court 
in the alternative, for summary judgment against Brundage, Ivie 
and Morgan. {R. 80) Ohio Casualty based its motion for relief 
- 5 -
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on the fact that this Court had subsequently decided the case of 
Allstate v. Ivie, supra, wherein this Court declared that by 
arbitration the no-fault carrier should seek reimbursement from 
the liability carrier for its PIP payments. In the alternative, 
Ohio Casualty argued that it was entitled to judgment against 
Brundage and her attorneys, who received the double recovery. 
(The author herein did not represent Allstate until June 30, 
1980; R. 44.) 
In December 1980, the trial court granted Ohio 
Casualty's motion for relief and vacated the order dismissing 
Allstate. It also denied Ohio Casualty's motion for summary 
judgment against Brundage, Ivie and Morgan and dismissed the 
complaint as to them. (R. 99-102, 104) Allstate timely filed 
its Notice of Intent to Appeal. (R. 103) Allstate then filed a 
cross-claim against Brundage, Ivie and Morgan claiming that if 
Allstate is required to reimburse Ohio Casualty, Brundage and her 
attorneys should indemnify Allstate. In addition, since Ohio 
Casualty was seeking an order requiring Allstate to arbitrate, 
Allstate also prayed for declaratory relief that Allstate was not 
liable to Ohio Casualty, and requested the court to declare the 
rights and obligations of the parties. {R. 120-122) As a part 
of Allstate's prayer for declaratory relief, Allstate moved to 
consolidate the present action with the personal injury action, 
which motion was denied. (R. 124, 192, 193) 
Ohio Casualty thereafter made a motion for summary 
judgment which the court granted and ordered Allstate to 
- 6 -
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arbitrate the claim. (R. 185, 203-204) Allstate simultaneously 
made motion for summary judgment against Brundage, Ivie and 
Morgan and sought declaratory judgment, since all of the relevant 
facts were admitted by the parties. (R. 194) The court denied 
Al.lstate' s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Allstate• s 
cross-claim against Brundage, Ivie and Morgan. In addition, the 
trial court refused to grant declaratory judgment. (R. 210-213) 
In summary, the positions of the respective parties on 
the merits are as follows: 
Ohio Casualty's position is that it paid the amount of 
$8,313.80 in no-fault PIP benefits to Brundage and it is there-
fore entitled to be reimbursed from either Brundage and her 
attorneys, or Allstate, for the amount of $6,651.04 (80% of 
$8,313.80). 
The position of Brundage, Ivie and Morgan is that even 
though Brundage received $8,313.80 from Ohio Casualty, and in 
addition, the amount of $6, 583. 08 from Allstate by reason of the 
personal injury judgment (which admittedly constituted double 
recovery) , the Ivie case protects Brundage and her attorneys from 
any subrogation claim by Ohio Casualty, and Brundage and her 
attorneys are therefore entitled to the windfall. 
~llstate' s position is that since it had paid the full 
amount of the judgment in the personal injury action to Brundage 
and her attorneys, pursuant to the court's order, it is not 
liable to Ohio Casualty, since such would constitute double 
liability for Allstate; double recovery for Brundage; and double 
- 7 -
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recovery for Ohio Casualty. In any event, the maximum amount of 
Ohio Casualty's claim is only 80% of $8,228.84 (the amount of 
special damages found by the jury), not 80% of $8,313.80 (the 
total amount of PIP payments). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT ALLSTATE IS ENTITLED TO DECLARATORY RELIEF 
THAT RESPONDENTS BRUNDAGE AND HER ATTORNEYS ARE LIABLE 
FOR OHIO CASUALTY'S PIP REIMBURSEMENT CLAIM AND THAT 
APPELLANT ALLSTATE IS NOT LIABLE TO OHIO CASUALTY IN ANY EVENT 
In its cross-claim Appellant Allstate sought declaratory 
relief that it was not obligated to pay Ohio Casualty's PIP reim-
bursement claim and that Brundage and her attorneys must pay the 
claim. Allstate is entitled to declaratory relief on these 
issues pursuant to Section 78-33-1, et seq., Utah Code Ann. 
(1953), as amended, and Rule 57, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The trial court denied Allstate's request for declara-
tory relief and ordered that Allstate arbitrate the claim. If 
there is a legal issue to be decided, the court stated that the 
issue should be submitted to the court pursuant to Section 
78-31-13, which states: 
The arbitrators may on their own motion, and 
shall by request of a party to the arbi tr a-
t ion: 
(1) At any stage of the proceedings sub-
mit any question of law arising in the course 
of the hearing for the opinion of the court 
stating the facts upon which the question ari: 
ses, and such opinion when given shall bind 
the arbitrators in the making of their award. 
The error in the court's ruling is that Brundage and 
- 8 -
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her attorneys are interested parties whose rights and obligations 
are inseparably connected with the issues herein. Brundage and 
her attorneys would not be parties to the arbitration, nor would 
any arbitration decree be res judicata as to them. Therefore, 
the only remedy available to the parties is through the district 
court in a declaratory judgment action. Once the court has given 
its declaratory judgment, the matter may then be fully 
arbitrated, if necessary. 
Allstate's request for declaratory relief is consistent 
with the legislative intent, as codified in Section 78-32-12, 
Utah Code Ann., as amended, which states: 
This Chapter is declared to be remedial: its 
purpose is to settle and to afford relief from 
uncertainty and insecurity with respect to 
rights, status and other legal relations: and 
is to be liberally construed and administered. 
The trial court has adjudicated that Brundage and her 
attorneys are not liable to Ohio Casualty or Allstate. In order 
to reverse the trial court, it is necessary for th is Court to 
declare the rights and responsibility of all the parties herein. 
A. RESPONDENTS BRUNDAGE, IVIE AND MORGAN ARE RESPONSIBLE TO PAY 
OHIO CASUALTY'S PIP REIMBURSEMENT CLAIM. 
Prior to Allstate v. Ivie, the reimbursement of PIP 
benefits paid to the injured party caused continual problems 
because almost every settlement and judgment in a personal injury 
action included the PIP reimbursement claim, resulting in addi-
tional litigation, expenses and attorney's fees, which are 
counterproductive to the purpose of the Utah No-Fault Act, 
Section 31-41-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended. This Court 
- 9 -
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resolved these problems by holding in the Ivie case that: {l) 
the injured party has no interest in the PIP carrier's claim for 
reimbursement; {2) the injured party cannot recover from the 
tort-feasor for his damages compensated by the PIP payments; {3) 
,, 
the no-fault carrier's claim for reimbursement must be determined 
by arbitration. 
Because the personal injury judgment herein was entered 
before the Ivie decision, the above guidelines were not adhered 
to. Though Ivie states that the no-fault carrier has no subroga-
tion right against its own insured, this holding must be 
interpreted in light of the facts of the Ivie case and the sub-
sequent related cases. In ~ the injured party contested the 
fact that the settlement included reimbursement for the PIP 
payments, and expressly denied the same. There was never an 
agreement or an adjudication that the settlement fully compen-
sated Mrs. Ivie, thereby resulting in double recovery to her. 
The Ivie case does not stand for the proposition that 
under all circumstances the no-fault carrier cannot subrogate 
against its own insured. It stands only for the proposition that 
where there is a pre-trial settlement, and said settlement does 
not explicitly include an amount for the PIP payments, the no-
fault carrier cannot subrogate against its insured. However, 
where the settlement clearly includes the PIP payments, thus 
resulting in double recovery to the injured party, then subroga-
tion' is permitted {minus attorney's fees and costs). This was 
the express holding of the cases which followed Ivie: Guaranty 
- 10 -
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National Insurance Co. v. Morris, 611 P.2d 725 (Utah 1980) and 
Street v. Farmers, 609 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1980). 
~his equitable principle was stated int he case of 
Dupuis v. Neilson, infra. When referring to the cases of 
Street v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, supra; Allstate v. Ivie, 
supra; and Jones v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 592 P.2d 609 
(Utah 1979), this Court stated: "These cases are predicated upon 
the proposition that a basic principle of the No-Fault Act is to 
prevent double recovery by the no-fault insured." 624 P. 2d at 
686. 
This point was also made clear by Chief Justice Crockett 
in his concurring opinion in the case of Allstate v. Anderson, 
608 P.2d 235 (Utah 1980), when he stated: 
If it appears that the wrongdoer "is or would 
be legally liable" to the claimant, then the 
wrongdoer's insurer must reimburse the 
claimant's insurer for its PIP payments it has 
made, this to be done under the procedure pro-
vided in Section 31-41-11, U.C.A. 1953 
[arbitrationJ; and this PIP payment is not to 
be considered as part of any settlement bet-
ween the claimant and the wrongdoer or his 
insurer. (Unless the parties clearly under-
stand and agree otherwise.). This, in 
order to prevent double recovery, and double 
payment for the same loss. (Emphasis added) 
To prevent double liability on the part of a liability 
carrier, this Court stated in Ivie that the trial court should 
appropriately reduce the judgment by the amount of the PIP 
payments. See also, Dupuis v. Nielson, 624 P.2d 685, 687 (Utah 
1981) • 
The only logical conclusion from these cases, when 
- 11 -
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jointly considered, is that if a personal injury action results 
in a judgment fully paid by the liability carrier, and it is 
clear that the judgment includes an amount for damages previously 
compensated by PIP payments, then the no-fault carrier should be 
reimbursed by its insured, minus attorney's fees and costs. 
In the present case, there is no dispute that the 
judgment in the personal injury action did include damages for 
which Brundage previously received compensation through PIP 
payments. To prevent double payment of the same loss by 
Allstate, and to prevent double recovery on the part of Brundage, 
Brundage should be liable to Ohio Casualty for its PIP reimburse-
ment claim, minus reasonable attorney's fees and costs. 
Be IN ANY EVENT, ALLSTATE IS NOT LIABLE TO OHIO CASUALTY FOR ANY 
AMOUNT OF SAID PIP REIMBURSEMENT CLAIM. 
Any right of recovery that Ohio Casualty may have 
against Allstate is founded upon Section 31-41-11, Utah Code 
Ann., as amended, 1953, which states: 
{a) that where its tliability carrier's] 
insured is or would be held legally liable 
for the personal in]uries sustained by any 
person to whom benefits required under this 
act have been paid by another insurer, 
including the State Insurance Fund, it will 
reimburse such other insurer for the payment 
of such benefits, but not in excess of the 
amount of damages so recoverable. (Emphasis 
added) 
Allstate, the liability carrier, is therefore respon-
sible to reimburse Ohio Casualty to the extent that Allstate's 
insured "is held legally liable for the personal injury •.. but 
not in excess of the amount of damages so recoverable." Since 
- 12 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Allstate has paid the full amount of the recoverable damages to 
Brundage, pursuant to court order, Ohio Casualty is not entitled 
to any recovery, because such would be "in excess of the amount 
of damages so recoverable," which the statute expressly forbidso 
The basic objectives and equitable principles of law 
upon which subrogation is founded are as follows: 
1. A party is not entitled to double recovery for the 
same loss. 
2. If there is double recovery, the insurer is entitled 
to be reimbursed for its payments to its insured, to the extent 
of double recovery. 
3. rrhe tort-feasor and his liability carrier are not 
obligated to pay both the injured party and his insurance company 
for the same loss, which would constitute double liability. 
If the dismissal of Brundage and her attorneys is upheld 
and if Allstate is required to pay Ohio Casualty's claim, there 
will be three injustices that run contrary to the above basic 
principles of law and equity: 
1. Brundage is allowed to keep her double recovery. 
2. Allstate is required to pay twice for the same loss. 
3. Ohio Casualty would receive double recovery; once 
through its premium and once through its reimbursement. 
rrhere is no equity in allowing Ohio Casualty, who 
received a premium for its loss, to be fully reimbursed for this 
loss at the expense of Allstate who did not receive a premium for 
double liability. 
- 13 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
To be cons is tent with the above principles and to pre-
vent inequity, the Court should declare that in any event 
Allstate is not liable to Ohio Casualty for its PIP reimbursement 
claim. 
C. THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF OHIO CASUALTY'S CLAIM IS ONLY $6,583.08. 
Ohio Casualty is seeking reimbursement of $6,651.04 (80% 
of the $8,313.80). It is not denied that Ohio Casualty paid a 
total of $8,313.80 in PIP benefits to Brundage, however, Ohio 
Casualty can only seek reimbursement for the amount the tort-
feasor "would be held legally liable." ~ 31-41-11, Utah Code 
Ann. (1953), as amended. 
~he jury determined that Brundage's total special 
damages were $8, 228. 84. tn addition, Brundage was found to be 
20% constributorily negligent. Therefore, the maximum amount 
that Ohio Casualty can claim is 80% of $8,228.84, or $6,583.08. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE THE JUDGMENT OF 
DISMISSAL IN FAVOR OF ALLSTATE, AFTER A PERIOD OF OVER 
1-1/2 YEARS FROM THE DATE OF SAID JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
On December 6, 1978, Appellant Allstate made motion for 
summary judgment upon the grounds that it had fully paid the 
judgment in the personal injury action, which included the amount 
representing the PIP payments. In April 1979, the trial court 
granted Allstate's motion and dismissed Allstate from the action. 
In May 1980, Ohio Casualty made motion for relief from 
said judgment of dismissal, pursuant to Rule 60 (b) (7), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, upon the grounds that th is Court had sub-
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sequently decided in Allstate v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 {1980), 
which held that reimbursement claims for PIP payments should be 
handled through arbitration and that the no-fault carrier has no 
right to subrogate against its own insured. In December 1980, 
the court granted Ohio Casualty's motion to set aside the 
dismissal, holding that its prior decision was erroneous. The 
trial court stated: 
The Court's ruling was based upon various 
erroneous rulings of this Court prior to the 
decisions in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Louise 
Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197, wherein the Supreme Court 
of this state held that the P.t.P. insurer was 
required by the Act to arbitrate its claim 
with the liability insurer against whom the 
insured P.I.P. plaintiff secured a judgment, 
but that the liability insurer had no rights 
as to the judgment secured. 
(R .. 99-100) 
The issue is whether the court abused its discretion in 
granting a motion under Rule 60 (b) (7), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, made over a year after the original judgment. The 
applicable portion of Rule 60(b) states: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court may in the furtherance of justice 
relieve a party . • from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons • (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time. 
A judicial error in the application of the law is not 
grounds for relief under Rule 60(b). ~he proper way to correct 
judicial error is through a motion for new trial or to appeal. 
In a similar case, Richards v. Siddoway, 24 Utah 2d 314, 471 P.2d 
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143 (1970}, the trial court granted a motion for relief from the 
judgment under Rule 60. In reversing the trial court this Court 
stated: 
Since 1939 under both the statute and the 
Rules of Civil Procedure, one wishing to amend 
a judgment valid upon its face must move to 
do so within three months except for correc-
tion of clerical errors. 
471 P.2d at 145. 
~he Court cited and quoted with approval the rule stated 
in 49 C.J.Se, Judgments, Section 238, and explained: 
After expiration of the term at which it was 
rendered •.. a judgment is no longer open to 
any amendment, revision, modification, or 
correction which involves the exercise of the 
judgment or discretion of the court on the 
merits or on matters of substance • • the 
Court has no power at such time to revise and 
amend a judgment by correcting judicial 
errors. 
* * * 
There must be an end to the time when judgment 
can be questioned. 
In this case the protestant had a remedy 
by motion for new trial and also by appeal, 
but she permitted the time limited by law 
therefor to lapse without seeking either. 
Nearly a year after the adjournment of the 
term at which the proceedings were had, she, 
by a motion, attempted to avoid the judgment 
upon extrinsic grounds. It is a case plainly 
within the rule which denies jurisdiction of a 
court to open or vacate its judgments under 
such circumstances. 
471 P.2d at 145, 147. 
The above principles of law were reaffirmed in the case 
of Parker v. Rolfson, 525 P.2d 612 (Utah 1974). 
Moore's Federal Practice § 60.27 tll at 348 (1979). 
- 16 -
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There is good policy behind the law favoring finality 
to judgments. If a judicial error is grounds to set aside a 
judgment that is not timely appealed, then no judgment would ever 
be final. 
All of the relevant facts supporting plaintiff's claim 
were known and argued to the court at the time the court 
dismissed Allstate from the action. Nothing new relating to the 
merits of the case was presented to the court. A motion for 
relief under Rule 60 (b) made 13 months after the trial court's 
ruling is not made within a reasonable time. 
In conclusion, the court erred in granting relief from 
the judgment in favor of Allstate under Rule 60 (b) because: (1) 
misapplication of the law is not grounds for setting aside a 
judgment under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) 
in any event, 13 months after the entry of judgment is an 
unreasonable amount of time to bring a motion for relief. 
POINT III 
IN THE EVENT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN SETTING ASIDE 
THE JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL IN FAVOR OF ALLSTATE, THE COURT 
ERRED IN NOT AMENDING THE PERSONAL INJURY JUDGMENT TO 
REDUCE IT BY THE AMOUNT OF PIP PAYMENTS 
As mentioned above, the trial court vacated its order 
dismissing Allstate from this action upon the grounds that its 
prior ruling was erroneous in light of the Ivie case. Shortly 
after the trial court set aside the dismissal, Allstate filed a 
cross-claim against Brundage, Ivie and Morgan, alleging that the 
order in a personal injury action requiring Allstate to pay the 
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full judgment, unreduced 
improper under the Ivie 
should reimburse Allstate 
by the amount of PIP payments, was 
case, and Brundage and her attorneys 
for said amount. This cross-claim 
constituted a claim for relief from the personal injury judgment 
pursuant to Rule 60 (b) , which allows a motion for relief to be 
brought in an independent action. All of the parties necessary 
to seek relief from the personal injury judgment are present 
herein. (It is not necessary that Kernan, defendant in the per-
sonal injury action, be present since Allstate is Kernan's liabi-
lity carrier, Allstate paid Brundage's judgment, Kernan would not 
be liable for PIP reimbursement claim, and Allstate is the real 
party in interest.) 
The inequity and error on the part of the trial court 
was its application of the Ivie case in favor of Ohio Casualty, 
without equal application in favor of Allstate. There is no 
question that had the Ivie case been decided before the trial of 
the personal injury action, the application of the Ivie case 
would have resolved all of the problems created herein. The 
trial court would have reduced the judgment by the amount of the 
PIP payments. The remaining judgment would. have been paid to 
Brundage and her attorneys. Ohio Casualty would have made demand 
upon Allstate for reimbursement of the PIP payments and Allstate 
would have paid the same. Instead, the personal injury judgment 
was not reduced by the PIP payments, and Allstate was ordered to 
pay the full judgment. 
If the court is going to set aside the dismissal of 
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Allstate from the action based upon the Ivie case, the court must 
equally apply the Ivie case to Respondents Brundage and her 
attorneys, thereby reducing the judgment by the amount of the PIP 
payments and ordering Brundage and her attorneys to repay said 
amount to Allstate. Allstate will then be in a position to pay 
Ohio Casualty's reimbursement claim without being subject to 
double liability. 
Failure to apply the principles outlined in the Ivie case 
equally to all of the parties involved herein, resulted in gross 
inequity and abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. 
A court of equity is designed to do equity, not create inequity. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court declare 
Respondents Brundage and her attorneys liable for the PIP 
reimbursement claim of Respondent Ohio Casualty, upon the grounds 
that it is Brundage and her attorneys who have received double 
recovery. The Court should also deny Ohio Casualty's right to 
recover its PIP reimbursement claim from Allstate, because to do 
otherwise would result in double recovery to Ohio Casualty at the 
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expense of Allstate, who would then be subject to double liabi-
lity .. The order dismissing Allstate from this action should 
therefore be reinstated. 
DATED this 2nd day of August, 1982 .. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
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